the story of these social activists and lawyers as the one worth telling, Garrow -through an evenhanded but generally sympathetic portrayal of these individuals -places his readers in the shoes of one side of the bitter struggle over abortion. The prolife community, to the extent Garrow considers it, is typically portrayed in less sympathetic terms.12 For Garrow, who -in promoting Liberty and Sexuality -has described Operation Rescue as "really beyond the pale in just the same way the Klan is,"'3 the prolife community is principally viewed as an obstacle on the path toward the achievement of liberty.
Garrow's second technique is purely factual. Specifically, by demonstrating that Catholic interests in Connecticut effectively and repeatedly blocked efforts to repeal that state's anticontraceptive law and that a burgeoning right-to-life movement may well have undermined prochoice legislative reform efforts, Liberty and Sexuality implies that court action was instrumental to the cause of reproductive freedom.14 In striking this significant blow for judicial activism, Garrow masterfully rebuffs two strands of historically based criticism of Griswold and Roe. First, Garrow lays to rest the claim that Yale law professors cooked up Griswold because, as Judge Bork put it at his confirmation hearing, "they like this kind of litigation."'5 Instead, he demonstrates that before Griswold struck it down, Connecticut's anticontraception law had blocked creation of family planning centers for low-income women for more than two decades, thereby providing an equity-based justification for the lawsuit. Second, contrary to the recent wave of attacks by prochoice liberals -including Clinton Supreme Court appointee 12. Garrow limits his description of John Noonan -then a University of California law professor and now a federal appeals court judge -to three words: "Roman Catholic lawyer." P. 330. Noonan, however, fares much better than Reagan Associate Deputy Attorney General Bruce Fein -whom Garrow refers to as " [ 14. This lesson is implicit in Liberty and Sexuality. Garrow's technique is to sweep his readers away in a tidal wave of information and, after they have recovered from this factual onslaught, to let them reach whatever conclusions they may. Ruth Bader Ginsburg -against Roe as being counterproductive to the prochoice movement, Garrow's history lesson makes clear that the prochoice movement was necessarily dependent upon judicial action.
Garrow's history lesson is incomplete, however. While demonstrating that Roe was a necessary step to the creation of meaningful abortion rights, Liberty and Sexuality inaccurately infers that the story of reproductive freedom is one of judicial resistance to legislatures dominated by prolife interest groups. Garrow does not consider the ways in which judicial decisionmaking and elected government action affected each other. For example, although Liberty and Sexuality considers post-Roe developments up through the Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirmation of abortion rights in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,16 it limits its sights to court-related action. Garrow does not give any meaningful treatment to legislation and regulation designed to alter the face of abortion rights. More significantly, he does not consider the ramifications of such elected government action on Court decisionmaking. Garrow simply cannot achieve his grander objective of helping "people to appreciate what Roe really represents"17 without considering the constitutional dialogue that has taken place between the courts and elected government in the three decades since Griswold and the two decades since Roe.
That Garrow's presentation is incomplete reveals Liberty and Sexuality's obsession with elevating the stature of Roe v. Wade to a victory for American freedom on the order of Brown v. Board of Education. At one level, Garrow's comparison fails because Brown is generally understood to be "the greatest moral triumph constitutional law ha[s] ever produced,"18 whereas honorable people can disagree about the moral rightness of a decision that places reproductive autonomy ahead of potential human life. Yet, even if the Roe-Brown analogy is appropriate -as it almost certainly is for a good many of Garrow's readers -Brown itself points to the necessity of getting beyond Supreme Court decisions and into elected government action in explicating the shaping of constitutional values. Just as the story of Brown must include southern resistance, the 1964 Civil Rights Act,19 and the busing controversy, the story of Roe v. Wade encompasses abortion funding restrictions, the "gag rule," and several other legislative and executive initiatives. This review will help put Roe in proper perspective by considering the ways that elected government and judicial action influence each other. In particular, the story of abortion rights must consider how social and political forces contributed to the Court's moderation of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a decision that replaced Roe's stringent trimester standard with a less demanding "undue burden" test.20 While this exercise may deflate Roe's achievements, it will also point to the pivotal role that Supreme Court decisions play in elected government deliberations. Specifically, when considering the constitutionality of legislative and regulatory initiatives, elected government has looked to Supreme Court decisions as the defining benchmark. Furthermore, rather than approving legislation or regulations directly at odds with Roe, elected government has expressed its opposition through funding bans and other indirect techniques. Finally, and most significantly, Roe and its progeny shaped elected government attitudes toward abortion. The result of this interaction is that despite the Casey Court's returning much of the abortion issue to the states, state lawmakers apparently preferring the Roe-created status quo -no longer appear interested in enacting antiabortion restrictions.
Liberty and Sexuality recognizes neither the profound role played by political and social influences in Court decisionmaking nor the equally profound effect of Court decisionmaking in shaping the scope and sweep of elected government action. Garrow's book is nonetheless monumental -far and away the definitive guide to the Court's reasoning in and the political developments that preceded Griswold and Roe. This review, building upon Garrow's lessons regarding the Supreme Court's role in the abortion dispute, offers an alternative paradigm to the one Garrow suggests. Part I of this review summarizes Liberty and Sexuality's ample teachings about the leadership role that courts played in fueling the reproductive autonomy movement. Without decisions like Griswold and Roe, as Liberty and Sexuality makes clear, it is uncertain whether and when the political process would have recognized an individual's right to reproductive freedom. Part II of this review extends the teachings of Liberty and Sexuality by considering the ways elected government and the courts influence each other.
I. THE ROAD TO ROE
Liberty and Sexuality is at its best when demonstrating the necessity of judicial action to make reproductive freedom meaningful, particularly by using the stories of those involved in this crusade. Contrary to what we are led to believe by the self-serving revision-20. 112 S. Ct. at 2819. ist histories of conservatives who dislike judicially created rights and progressives who now see the legislatures as more rightsprotective than the courts, the evisceration of Connecticut's anticontraception statute and the establishment of meaningful abortion rights required judicial intervention.
A. Birth Control in Connecticut
Garrow's presentation of the story of Griswold is truly a revelation, for the Bork view that Griswold was simply a test case put together by a group of elites at the Yale law school is widely shared. Indeed, during my first year of teaching, I was told a tale about how the wife of Yale University's president -who, along with her upper-crust friends, was active in Planned Parenthood -convinced New Haven's chief of police at a cocktail party to arrest her for violating the otherwise unenforced anticontraception statute.21 The truth of the matter is that the Connecticut law blocked the operation of family planning clinics, preventing poor women from, among other things, being able to be fitted for diaphragms.22 Roman Catholic hospitals in several Connecticut cities, moreover, dismissed from their staffs doctors who publicly opposed the anticontraception statute.23 While men were able to purchase condoms at gas stations, drug stores, and the like (p. 128), and women of means were able to skirt the Connecticut law through statecondoned diaphragm fittings at the offices of noncomplying physicians (p. 136), the effect of the anticontraception statute was hardly imaginary.
The real story of Griswold begins in 1939. In June of that year, the Catholic Clergy Association of Waterbury passed a resolution, "read from the pulpit of each and every Roman Catholic Church in Waterbury," condemning birth control as "contrary to the natural law and therefore immoral" and calling for the enforcement "to the full extent of the law" of an 1879 Connecticut criminal statute sanctioning individuals who use or assist in the use of contraceptives (p. The possibility that elected government output may not measure elected government preferences also suggests that one should not read too much into elected government resistance to Roe. Many elected officials were quietly pleased by Roe. John Hart Ely, for example, speaks of "[t]he sighs of relief as this particular albatross was cut from the legislative and executive necks."67 That states enacted an avalanche of abortion restrictions may only mean that legislators saw no downside in responding to prolife interest groups, for prochoice concerns were content to leave it to the courts to protect their interests. In a sense, federal and state efforts to limit abortion rights paid homage to a judiciary that would tow the line and provide whatever constitutional protections were appropriate.
Roe's transformation of the political marketplace, in other words, was rooted in the belief that the Supreme Court would vigorously defend abortion rights. By legalizing abortion, Roe eliminated the demand for prochoice legislation while leaving the demand for prolife legislation unaffected, or perhaps even causing it to grow. At the same time, Roe also increased the supply of prolife legislation. Before the decision, the benefit the prochoice movement obtained from a legislative victory was offset by the loss the prolife movement sustained, and vice versa. But Roe eliminated many, if not most, negative externalities associated with prolife laws. By writing abortion rights into the Constitution, the Court assured prochoicers that they could not lose the benefits they had won. Specifically, because courts likely would invalidate antiabortion measures that ran afoul of Roe's trimester test, prochoicers had little reason to fight legislative efforts to limit abortion access. Consequently, legislators voting on prolife bills no longer had to worry that their prochoice constituents might complain. Instead, they could vote for the bills so that the prolife activists would obtain a legislative benefit, while Roe ensured that prochoice citizens would not suffer any measurable loss.
Despite Casey is a remarkable decision. At one level, the Court seems beside itself in self-doubt. Acknowledging that it can neither appropriate funds nor command the military to enforce its orders, the Court recognizes that its power lies "in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary."91 In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell observe, the Court seems to believe "that public acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution -that is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legitimacy -enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions."92 This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary seems proof positive that the outcome in Casey cannot be divorced from the case's explosive social and political setting.93
Casey, however, goes to great lengths to declare that "social and political pressures,"94 far from being relevant, must be resisted. Otherwise, anarchy will rule the day, for our nation will have forsaken its commitment "to the rule of law. 103. While many of these antiabortion measures were the triumph of well-organized and intensely interested political minorities over a prochoice majority that left it to the courts to protect their interests, it is nonetheless true that these measures were enacted through the "majoritarian" political process. Consequently, although Court decisions striking down these abortion restrictions may have matched public opinion, these Court decisions -like any decision striking down the action of elected majoritieswere technically countermajoritarian. 
